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1. Introduction 
In the past years several minor and severe environmental disasters took place. For example: the 
fireworks disaster in Enschede or the fire in Chemie-Pack Moerdijk. Disasters with hazardous 
effects for humans and their environment, in which the governmental supervision didn't work 
adequately. 
 
 
The Omgevingsdienst Noordzeekanaal-gebied, a new governmental organization, ensures the  
proper implementation of laws and regulations to provide a safe and healthy environmental 
protection for the whole North Sea and Schiphol region. This new organization, a multi partner 
alliance, combines the knowledge of professionals of the Province of North Holland and the 
municipalities Aalsmeer, Amstelveen, Amsterdam, Diemen, Haarlemmermeer, Ouder-Amstel, 
Uithoorn and Zaanstad. Combining knowledge, experience and capacity, the new organization 
(omgevingsdienst) aims to make the quality of the monitoring, supervising and permit authorization 
higher. The purpose is to put the government in a position to respond more adequately to complex 
environmental legislations. Also the government can act more efficiently in the process of permit 
authorization. But management control of multi partner alliances is complicated and there is not a 
lot of research done in the area of governance of these kind of alliances (Rochemont, 2010). 
 
 
1.1 Joint ventures/multi partner alliances 
Organizations cannot depend only on their own skills and knowledge to innovate (Chesbrough, 
2003; Vanhaverbeke, 2006). In order to create value, organizations need to integrate the knowledge 
and skills of other organizations and customers (Chesbrough, 2003). In the last couple of years there 
is a big growth in different forms of collaborations between organizations (Tsang, 1998). 
Organizations team up to produce and market (new) products. Multi partner alliances exist in 
different sectors, such as telecom (Lavie et al., 2007) or agriculture (De Man, 2006; Vanhaverbeke, 
De Rochemont, Meijer and Roijnakkers, 2007). 
 
 
Syntens1, the Dutch governmental organization for innovation and research, detected two trends in 
Dutch multi partner alliances: 
1. Between 2005 and 2007 the number of registered multi partner alliances increased by 700% 
(Syntens). 
2. 50 - 75% of all multi partner alliances stopped before their targets were reached. This is the same 
failure rate as for dyadic alliances (Harrigan, 1988). 
 
 
There are a couple of examples, which show why a multi partner alliance can fall apart. A classic 
example is the MIPS-network (million instructions per second) (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Hwang et 
al., 1997). A couple of producers of semiconductors had the ambition to create a common RISC 
(resources information standards committee) standard. Eventually each partner began to promote 
their own standard. The consequence was that in the end there was not a common standard, which 
resulted in the alliance failure. Management control of a multi partner alliance is not a simple task. 
As it will be explained in the next paragraph. There is some research done about the management 
control of dyadic alliances, but very little is known about multi partner alliances (Garcia-Canal et 
al., 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In: De Rochemont, 2010 
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1.2 Challenges for management control 
Managers can face different difficulties in managing a multi partner alliance. The first difficulty is 
free riding. (Dyer et al,. 2000; Das et al., 2002). Dyer et al. (2000) states that successful 
collaboration depends on whether the participants in the multi partner alliance have free access to 
each others’ products, ideas and knowledge. This means that a partner can enter a multi partner 
alliance, obtain valuable information and leave the alliance. This kind of opportunistic behavior 
from partners will undermine the development of trust. Trust is a crucial precondition for successful 
collaboration (Das et al., 2003). A second difficulty is that the more partners there are in an alliance 
the conflicts increase, simply because there are more partners with different interests and ideas 
(Garcia-Canal et al., 2003). More partners can also compete with each other, as the above 
mentioned example of the MIPS network. A third problem is that with a large number of partners 
the costs for coordination and communication increases (Parkhe, 1993; Garcia-Canal et al., 2003). 
 
 
Syntens2 researched 100 Dutch managers to understand what are the critical preconditions of 
successful multi partner alliances. These are: 
• Make clear agreements before the alliance start 
• Uphold commitment 
• Active network managers 
• Better partner selection 
• Less partners 
• Start with the business model 
• Formulate goals 
 
 
The Syntens research also states that the continuation of social commitment of partners is crucial. 
This commitment cannot be only social, but must be also financial. The need for social commitment 
is supported by Das and Teng (1998) and Jones et al. (1997). They state that multi partner alliances 
need strong social governance, because it is impossible to control every action by formal  
governance processes. But it also depends in which phase the multi partner alliance is operating. 
Alliances have different phases in their lifecycle (Spekman et al., 1998; Doz, 1996). The importance 
of the phase in which the alliance is operating is crucial. As mentioned before the Syntens study 
showed that a lot alliances stopped before targets were reached. So the phase in which the alliance  
is starting up is very important. This start up phase is called the pre-formation phase. In the pre- 
formation phase (before formal commitment of partners has been established) alliance partners  
don’t know each other. Therefore for example trust may still not be strong, cultural distances also 
may exist and the members might be engaged in the process of trust building, which can take 
considerable time (Gulati et al., 2000). When the alliance performs well and formal arrangements 
are made, trust between partners will likely become stronger. But theory also suggests that making 
clear formal agreements in the pre-formation phase will be enhancing trust in the alliance 
(Rochemont, 2010). Though other scholars (Das et al., 2002) claim that to emphasize the aspect of 
formal agreements can undermine the trust in the alliance. So it is a delicate situation to judge  
which kind of governance mode needs to be used. 
 
 
In this thesis i'm using a climate approach (Rochemont, 2010), which is used to operationalize the 
two forms of governance, meaning formal and social governance. The climate approach is an 
interesting approach because it approaches complex interactional patterns, like formal and social 
governance, not isolated, but integrated. The climate approach is derived from organizational 
 
 
2 In: Rochemont, 2010 
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psychology. Naylor, Pritchard and Ilgen (1980) describe this concept as follows: “climates are 
descriptive judgments that arise out of events, processes and contingencies that exists within 
settings”. In chapter 2.3 the climate approach is discussed in more detail. 
 
 
The climate approach in combination with a qualitative research approach is very suitable to obtain 
an in-depth understanding of how processes of management control in a multi partner alliance work 
in the pre-formation phase. 
 
 
1.3 Research question 
How does the interaction between formal governance, constituted by the financial climate, 
management and organizational climate, and social governance, constituted by the relational 
climate, in the multi partner alliance omgevingsdienst in the pre - formation phase evolve? 
 
 
Sub questions 
 
 
What does the existing literature tell us about the interaction between formal governance 
and social governance? 
 
 
What is the empirical reality about the relation between formal and social governance? 
 
 
Are there differences between the theoretical developed ideas and empirical findings? What are 
the implications? 
 
 
1.4 Reading guide 
In chapter two all theoretical concepts are described, from a general abstract level to a more 
concrete and specific level. The general concept is control and consists of formal and social 
governance. Then, climates will be explained, because in this thesis governance (social and formal) 
are constituted by climates, and how individual variables in the climates are interacting with each 
other. In chapter three there is an overview on the methodology. In this thesis a case study was 
conducted, crucial documents were analyzed and key figures were interviewed. Chapter four starts 
with a chronological contextual story about the startup phase of the omgevingsdienst, and highlight 
some crucial events in relation to my research question. Furthermore, some important empirical 
topics are discussed. Chapter five is the discussion between the theoretical concepts and the 
empirical results. Chapter six summarizes the conclusions, the limitations of this research and 
suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical constructs 
This chapter introduces the most important theories and theoretical concepts, which direct and give 
focus to the research. First the general problems, derived from literature, about the relationship 
between control and trust will be discussed. Control consists of formal and social governance. In 
formal governance the goal is to have control by formal instruments, like clear financial 
agreements. The goal is to achieve or maintain trust by these agreements and to stay in control. 
Social governance has as a goal to maintain in control by giving alliance partners trust and uses 
relational aspects as a means to stay in control. The climate approach is a descriptive and holistic 
way to analyze the different governance modes. The climates consist of different variables. In 
model 1 all concepts and their relations are described. 
 
 
In this thesis the following definition of a multi partner alliance is used, based on Lavie et al. 
(2007), Vanhaverbeke and Cloodt (2006), Rochemont (2010): 
 
 
“A multi partner alliance is a collective, voluntary organizational association with more than two 
members, with common objectives, joint decision-making and shared risks, who interactively  
engage in multilateral value chain activities, such as collaborative research, development, sourcing, 
production, marketing and commercialization of technologies, products and/or services”. 
 
 
In model 1 all concepts and relationships are explained. In paragraph 2.1 formal and social 
governance as control mechanisms are explained in relation to trust. In 2.2 the interaction between 
these governance forms are explained. In 2.3 the climate approach is explained, because the 
climates make up the governance forms. In 2.4 the financial climate is explained in detail, because 
the financial climate is an important climate in making up formal governance. In paragraph 2.5 the 
management and organizational climate is explained which is the other important climate that 
makes up formal governance. Paragraph 2.6 is explaining the relational climate in detail. This 
climate is making up social governance. Paragraph 2.7 and 2.8 are discussing the interaction 
patterns between the different climates that are used in this thesis. 
 
 
2.1 Formal governance, social governance and trust 
Formal governance and social governance (the latest often also referred to as relational governance) 
are both two forms of control mechanisms. Both forms of governance use different instruments to 
strengthen management control in an organization. Formal governance in this thesis consists of two 
climates. The financial climate and the management and organizational climate. These climates 
consist of different variables. The financial climate is about making clear financial agreements, 
which includes financial risks, but this governance form is also focusing on creating a clear decision 
making process for all alliance partners. Social governance has a different set of instruments to 
strengthen management control. This governance mode is about creating social commitment and 
trust among partners. In this way trust can be seen as an instrument. On the other hand both 
governance forms are influencing trust in the alliance. By defining trust as one's positive 
expectations about a partners competencies, obligations, and goodwill (Sako,1992), trust can 
function as an effective coordination mechanism as a form of social governance, in particular if the 
“measurability” of the activities is low (Dyer et al., 1998). When trust exists, the firm does not fear 
its partners actions, because the partners can depend on each other to achieve a common purpose. 
Low levels of trust will lead to an underdevelopment of social commitment between the parties, 
social commitment is crucial for effective alliances (Cullen et al., 2000; Ireland et al., 2002). 
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2.2 Interaction between formal governance, social governance and trust 
In the management accounting literature the interaction between formal governance, social 
governance and trust is an important research topic. In this thesis different constructs are used to 
define formal and social governance. But first some general research dilemmas about governance 
and trust are explained. Translated to an inter-organizational setting (between different 
organizations), the primary purpose of governance can be described as creating the conditions that 
motivate the partners in an multi partner alliance to achieve desirable or predetermined outcomes. 
 
 
As mentioned before trust is defined as one's positive expectations about another's competencies, 
obligations, and goodwill, trust can function as an effective coordination mechanism, in particular if 
the “measurability” of the activities is low. Vanhaverbeke et al. (2006) argue that multi partner 
alliances require both formal governance mechanisms (clear financial agreements for example) and 
social governance mechanisms (social commitment) and suggest that these mechanisms are 
positively related to each other and benefits trust in the alliance. Other scholars (Dyer and Singh, 
1998) argue that self-enforcing agreements which rely on trust 'often replace' the formal control 
characteristics. Then there are also scholars who argue that one governance form might even 
undermine the development of the other form. That formal governance is negatively associated with 
social governance. Formal contracts can signal distrust for one's exchange partner and by 
undermining trust, this can encourage opportunistic behavior (Das et al., 1998; Ghoshal et al., 
1996). 
 
 
Despite arguments for viewing social governance and formal governance as substitutes or  
opposites, the logic for viewing them as supplements is also receiving support from scholars (Poppo 
et al., 2002). Poppo et al. (2002) in Rochemont (2010) show that the presence of clearly articulated 
contractual terms, remedies and processes of dispute resolution as well as relational norms of 
flexibility, solidarity, and continuance may inspire confidence to cooperate in multi partner  
alliances. Social governance complements the limits of contracts by fostering continuance of the 
exchange and entrusting both parties with mutually agreeable outcomes (Poppo et al., 2002). So 
empirical research on dyadic exchange relationships has found that formal and social governance 
actually supplement each other (Poppo et al., 2002). Other research has also shown that the  
presence of social elements such as trust actually made formal mechanisms more effective (Das et 
al., 1998). There were already some discussions that try to integrate variables of transactions cost 
economics and sociological variables (Garcia-Canal et al., 2003; Park et al., 1996). But in this thesis 
variables from the organizational psychology domain are also added. So management control in this 
thesis is seen as an interaction between formal and social governance, and is analyzed from a 
climate perspective which is derived from the domain of organizational psychology. These climates 
are descriptive based on all together, seven different variables. These variables are coming from 
different domains, transactions based variables, management variables but also sociological and 
organizational psychology variables. In model 1 all variables and relations can be seen. 
 
 
2.3 The climate approach 
Rochemont (2010) used the climate approach in his study of multi partner alliance performance, 
which is derived from organizational psychology. Naylor, Pritchard and Ilgen (1980) describe this 
concept as follows: “climates are descriptive judgments that arise out of events, processes and 
contingencies that exists within settings”. Formal and social governance are approached from a 
climate approach. Formal governance consists of the financial climate and the management and 
organizational climate. The financial climate consists of financial agreements, proper value 
appropriation and acceptability of financial risks. The management and organizational climate 
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consists of the network orchestrator, this is a role performed by an independent person who is 
responsible to make sure the different parties make agreements and is responsible for the process of 
building the multi partner alliance. The other element is clear decision-making process, which 
means that the partners have the idea that there is a transparent decision making process. Social 
governance consists of the relational climate. The relational climate in the alliance contains the 
perceptions of the partners concerning the relational quality of the cooperation. 
 
 
In this thesis the climate choice is focused on the financial, relational and two aspects of the 
management and organizational climate. This has several reasons. First of all in a time that 
everything is about cuttings costs, the financial climate plays a crucial role. Who is paying for 
what? What do I get in return and does this represent an equal exchange? These are crucial 
questions which theoretically influence the relational climate. The choice for involving also two 
aspects of the management and organizational climate is that the network orchestrator is a key 
person in the startup of the multi partner alliance to actually achieve agreements and build trust 
(Rochemont, 2010). The network orchestrator is also responsible for organizing a clear decision- 
making process, which is the second element of the management and organizational climate. 
 
 
2.4 Financial climate 
The financial climate consists of the perceptions of the alliance members regarding key financial 
issues in the alliance. Formal governance is a form of control which is constructed by the financial 
climate. The financial climate consists of two elements: financial agreements and acceptable 
financial risks. In this paragraph the relationship is explained in detail. 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, multi partner alliances have a greater risk for free riding and inter-firm 
conflicts due to different needs. Therefore it is important to make agreements about how value is 
created and is distributed (Dekker, 2003; VanHaverbeke et al., 2006). Multi partner alliances  
involve large investments which create financial risks for alliance members. This is why it is 
important to establish a healthy financial climate. The first element is making financial agreements 
about value appropriation. Vanhaverbeke et al., (2006) claim that it is necessary to calculate benefits 
along the alliance to ensure that all members receive a fair return. If participants are not satisfied 
about their return, members become dissatisfied and exit the alliance (Ireland et al., 2002). The 
second element is the level of financial risks for participating in the alliance, which should be 
acceptable for the partners. Firms can make financial agreements, but they will never have the 
guarantee that the alliance objectives will be realized. If the risks are perceived to be too high, 
alliance members may become uncertain whether their return on investment will be realized. Thus, 
if managers are satisfied with the financial risks involved for participating in the cooperation, 
chances for alliance success increase (Rochemont, 2010). 
 
 
2.5 The management and organizational climate 
The management and organizational climate consists of the perceptions of the alliance members 
regarding management and coordination issues in the alliance. The management and organizational 
climate make up the formal governance because in this perspective we are talking about a network 
orchestrator and a clear decision making process as instruments to obtain or strengthen management 
control. 
 
 
The first element of a good functioning organizational climate is the presence of a network 
orchestrator. Maintaining a group of partners can be difficult, due to the risk of different and 
conflicting interests. In multi partner alliances, a need exists concerning effective value creation and 
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value capturing. This requires active network management (Doz et al., 1998). According to Doz et 
al. (1998), whatever the formal governance structure, the collective has to have some way of 
coordinating system. Without leadership, a multi partner alliance can not expect to formulate and 
execute a consistent strategy (Bamford et al., 2003). Network orchestrators need to foster stability 
in the group by minimizing internal competition among member firms. Most of the time the 
network orchestrator is an independent alliance manager. This means that the person is not working 
for one of the partners, but for all of them. 
 
 
The second element of the management and organizational climate is a clear decision-making 
process in the alliance. Clarity in the decision–making process is important, because a lack of it can 
lead to ambiguity among members negatively influencing partner satisfaction and social 
commitment (De Rochemont, 2010). If decision–making is not clearly defined, it may become 
vague how decisions are made. Partners may feel isolated or ignored and could question whether 
they truly have influence on the actions required to achieve alliance objectives (De Rochemont, 
2010). 
 
 
2.6 Relational climate 
The relational climate in the alliance contains the perceptions of the partners concerning the 
relational quality of the cooperation (Rochemont, 2010) and is connected to social governance. 
Social governance is a form of control which in this thesis is constructed by the relational climate, 
which contains three elements: joint problem solving, trustworthiness and social commitment. In 
this paragraph the relationship is explained in more detail. 
 
 
An important element of the relational climate is trust. By defining trust as one's positive 
expectations about a partners competencies, obligations, and goodwill (Sako,1992), trust can 
function as an effective coordination mechanism, in particular if the “measurability” of the activities 
is low (Dyer et al., 1998). When trust exists, the firm does not fear its partners actions, because the 
partners can depend on each other to achieve a common purpose. Low levels of trust will lead to an 
underdevelopment of social commitment between the parties, which is crucial for effective alliances 
(Cullen et al., 2000; Ireland et al., 2002). Social commitment in an alliance contains a partner’s 
intention to continue the relationship (Cullen et al., 2000). Cullen et al. (2000) claim that without a 
sense of mutual social commitment, partners fail to work out the inevitable problems of alliances. 
Positive levels of social commitment between alliance partners contributes to a healthy relational 
climate. If partners in an alliance demonstrate mutual social commitment, the venture will develop 
based on the principle of fair exchange (Lane and Beamish, 1990). Fair exchange means that all 
partners believe and perceive that they receive benefits from the relationship that equal their 
contributions. 
 
 
Another important element of the relational climate is joint problem solving and refers to the extent 
to which disagreements with a partner have been productively resolved (Heide and Miner, 1992, 
Lusch and Brown, 1996). Joint problem solving increases the involvement of partners which in turn 
enhances their satisfaction and expectations with regards to the future. If partners solve problems 
jointly, satisfaction among partners and expectations about the future may positively be influenced. 
This also creates trust among the partners and in the alliance. In the next two paragraphs the 
interaction between the different climates are discussed. 
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2.7 The interaction between the financial and relational climate 
The financial climate is an important element of formal governance and as mentioned above the 
financial climate and the relational climate affect each other in various ways (de Rochemont, 2010). 
In this chapter some possible forms of interaction between the two climates are explained. 
 
 
The first is that the use of financial agreements creates barriers for opportunistic behavior of 
partners. As stated earlier, multi partner alliances face a special type of opportunism called free- 
riding. Das et al. (2002) claim that in multi partner alliances, there is a natural tendency for free- 
riding. Managers should therefore make agreements beforehand, which makes partners more 
accountable for their performance. In this way opportunistic behavior which undermines the 
relational climate could decrease. 
 
 
Financial agreement on fair value distribution reduces ambiguity and enhances social commitment 
towards fulfilling the cooperative goals (Vanhaverbeke & Cloodt, 2006). The acceptance of 
financial risks is the second element of the financial climate. Risks are acknowledged as critical 
factors in management research (Das et al., 2001). Especially financial risks are important in multi 
partner alliances, because multi partner alliances demand high risk and large upfront investments 
(Mothe et al., 2001; Browning et al., 1995). If the financial risks are acceptable for partners, it is 
likely to enhance the willingness of partners to stay involved in the alliance thus benefiting social 
commitment. Besides the positive influence of the financial climate on the relational climate, the 
relational climate may also enhance the financial climate (Rochemont, 2010). Firstly, social 
governance helps partners to improve their contract (Poppo et al., 2002). As a close relationship is 
developed and sustained, lessons from the prior period are reflected in revisions of the contract. 
Secondly, to have effective formal control over partners, a certain amount of trust is required (Das 
et al., 1998). If firms are lacking in trust and/or social commitment, alliance members will question 
their partner's motives and might give the impression that control is needed for advancing one's 
interests rather than the common alliance goals. 
 
 
2.8 The interaction between the management and organizational climate and the relational 
climate 
The management and organizational climate is an important element of formal governance and as 
mentioned before this climate affects the relational climate in different forms. In this chapter the 
possible forms of interaction will be described. 
 
 
According to Rochemont (2010) it is important that partners have a clear insight into the decision - 
making process within the alliance. A clear decision making process makes partners feel they are 
taken seriously because of the idea that the process itself is open for discussion. This has to do with 
the perception that, if you have the idea that decisions are made transparently, the whole decision 
making process itself is open for discussion. A transparent decision-making process creates space 
for communication which can improve understanding and decreases conflicts. The processes used 
to reach strategic decisions positively affect social commitment, attachment and trust of individual 
team members (Korsgaard et al., 1995). In the existing literature there is not empirical data about 
the interaction between the network orchestrator and the relational climate. 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Research design 
To understand and explore different relations between the climates and the effect on management 
control in a public alliance, a case study is an appropriate research design. A case study is an 
investigation of a specific, unique, bounded system (Stake, 1994, p. 237). Thus, a group, and an 
organization can be seen as cases. In this research the omgevingsdienst NZKG as an organization is 
the case. It is a qualitative research in which the researcher seeks to understand the life and 
experiences of a group of individuals (Baxter and Babbie, 2004, p. 419). On the other hand theory is 
used to form an open model about relationships between climates and their underlying variables. 
Some interesting theoretical concepts were used as interview topics for in depth exploration. So the 
model was not constructed to be tested in the research but to explore possible relationships between 
climates. It is about understanding the construction of reality through the eyes and minds of the 
research participants. The underlying philosophy of the research design is the belief that human 
action is centered in meaning, not in causes or functions. The goal of interpretive research is to 
understand what action means to people (Baxter and Babbie, 2004). Meaning making is complex. In 
order to understand it comprehensively, it's needed to weave together all of the bits of knowledge 
that can tell us more about the research topic. But meaning making varies depending on whom we 
talk to (Baxter and Babbie, 2004). The goal is to understand the web of meanings by describing its 
components semantic relationships and to weave together native and researcher interpretations in an 
attempt to understand the life experience of the native (Baxter and Babbie, 2004). 
 
 
Qualitative interviews are especially appropriate to understand in a richly detailed manner what an 
interviewee thinks and feels about some phenomenon (Baxter and Babbie, 2004). This is the main 
reason for choosing the research method of interviewing. 
 
 
3.2 Research participants 
In this research the following participants were interviewed: 
· Two members of the board of directors of the omgevingsdienst NZKG 
The board of directors consists of two directors who each have their own responsibilities. This is a 
very relevant group to investigate because these are the people who executed, thought of and 
negotiated about the new organization and it's governance. The new director of the omgevingsdienst 
NZKG performed the role of the network orchestrator in the pre-formation phase. 
· The mayor of one of the participating municipalities 
This represents the political board which is relevant for this research because the political board 
negotiated with the board of directors of the omgevingsdienst NZKG about the policy, financial 
issues and employer investments and are the clients of the board of the directors. Another  
interesting aspect is to understand if the political perspective gives an alternative explanations about 
the research question. 
· The management of three participating municipalities and the province of North – Holland 
These are the managers and directors of the municipalities. They prepared, thought, constructed and 
negotiated with the board of directors of the omgevingsdienst NZKG about policy proposals. The 
political decision makers and the public council eventually made the decisions. 
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Date Function Organization Interview length 
08/07/13 Director Municipality Zaanstad 55 minutes 
09/07/13 Director Province North Holland 50 minutes 
10/07/13 Director Municipality 
Haarlemmermeer 
62 minutes 
10/07/13 Governor Municipality 
Haarlemmermeer 
57 minutes 
24/07/13 Two directors Omgevingsdienst 58 minutes 
29/07/13 Director Municipality 
Amsterdam 
55 minutes 
 
 
 
3.3 Coding and analysis 
The design in qualitative interviewing is iterative. This means that each time the basic process of 
gathering information, analyzing it, coding it, and testing it, makes the model of the phenomenon of 
study clearer. So the process of coding will be done during and after the actual research. The coding 
process is characterized by analytic induction (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981), although analytic 
induction involves not only coding but also negative case analysis. This is a process of accounting 
discrepancies in the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This means that in the development of initial 
coding categories, the gathering of additional data and “testing” the categories against the new data, 
will be part of the process. If it disconfirms the categories, the coding categories need to be revised 
accordingly. For now the coding of the information will be structured by the chosen topics, which 
are the climates, as can be seen in appendix 1. 
 
 
The analysis of the material will focus on understanding relationships, testing the validity of the 
theoretical model and comprehend the complexity of the interaction between climates. 
 
 
3.4 Credibility 
To establish the credibility of this research, triangulation is useful. Norman Denzin (1978) identified 
four different forms of triangulation. The forms that are applicable to this research is the use of 
multiple and different sources of data. This is accomplished by comparing the experiences and 
perceptions of one informant with those of other informants. But also by member checking (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985), comparing the perceptions of the researcher with those of the research 
participants. Furthermore there was consistency in the way in which interviews were conducted. 
Every interview starts with asking the same open question, in this way the researcher does not 
influence the interviewee in thinking. All interviews are recorded so the researcher can listen back  
to the conversation. For the validity of the research Sandberg (2005) gives three related criteria; 
communicative validity, pragmatic validity and transgressive validity. Communicative validity 
means achieving truth according to the notion of perceived fulfillment. In the initial phase,  
gathering empirical data, communicative validity will be achieved by a community of  
interpretation. Which means that the researcher and the research participant have a shared 
understanding about what is the goal and method of the research. In this research this will be 
achieved by explaining to the research participants the goal of the research, and in short the 
concepts/topics in which the research is based. But also telling the participants that the interview is 
recorded, results are processed anonymous and the report of the interview is member checked with 
the participant, to make sure the report is an accurate statement of the interview. The researcher will 
also explain that the main interest is to understand their view and perspective on how they see the 
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interaction between different topics. The interview will be therefore a dialogue and not a question 
answer method. Questions like ‘what do you mean with that’? or ‘Can you elaborate more on this 
topic’ keeps the dialogue dynamic. This also enhances the communicative validity. Pragmatic 
validity is about paying attention to possible discrepancies between what people say they do and 
what they actually do. Here my actual experience in the alliance can be beneficial, in this case I also 
played the role of a participant observator. Transgressive validity is about looking for 
inconsistencies to understand if people are telling the truth. It has been argued that communicative 
and pragmatic validity are two appropriate criteria for justifying the extent to which truth has been 
achieved according to perceived fulfillment and fulfillment in practice. However, those criteria tend 
to encourage the researcher to search primarily for consistent and unequivocal interpretations of 
lived experience (Sandberg, 2005). In this research awareness for salient details or inconsistencies  
is important. This is because the main research goal is to understand the complexity of the case. By 
identifying inconsistencies complexity is made explicit. A way to achieve higher transgressive 
validity is to confront different statements from different participants about the same topic of 
different participants. Questions like: in another research a participant said the exact opposite of 
what you are saying, do you have an explanation for that? Or ‘First you say this about....and now 
you say .....this looks inconsistent, is it’? 
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4. Results 
 
 
4.1 A process view 
In 2008 the commission Mans, a research group that needed to investigate better ways of organizing 
safety, concluded that the municipalities are too fragmented to achieve a high quality of permit- 
regulation and supervision. The consequence was that the government chose to create a new 
organization that would be responsible for the safety in certain areas. This top-down and blueprint 
approach, focused on formal governance mechanisms, created a slow process. Because of the lack  
of joint meaning-making and problem solving (social governance), the potential partners needed to 
create their own vision regarding the omgevingsdienst NZKG and also find their position between 
other potential alliance partners. In June of 2010 the municipalities of Amsterdam, 
Haarlemmermeer, Velsen, Zaanstad and the province of North Holland acknowledged the 
importance of creating a new organization for safety and permit regulation. The potential alliance 
partners were talking to each other and exchanging ideas, the emphasis in the process was on 
enhancing the relation, joint meaning making and creating a common ground for ideas. So here the 
relational and management and organizational climate were dominant. On 5 October 2010 the 
intention agreement was signed, which meant partners were willing to develop the omgevingsdienst 
NZKG. The consequence was that an exploratory research needed to be conducted to the feasibility 
and added value of the omgevingsdienst NZKG. In this research the focus was on investigating 
formal and social governance criteria like, financial investments and willingness to cooperate with 
certain alliance partners. During this phase different interests (like: scope of the alliance, client - 
contractor relationship and responsibilities, financial agreements) of the alliance partners were 
becoming visible, because an independent research organization was speaking to all alliance 
partners. However, in May of 2011 the results of the research showed that a new organization in the 
specific area is feasible. From this moment on the focus shifted from the relational climate, 
especially joint meaning making and problem solving, to the financial climate, especially financial 
agreements and risks and the idea of fair exchange. As one director said: “the perception of fair 
exchange is very important. This means that what you put in the new organization is worth the 
energy. If this is not right, the risk that parties might leave the alliance is getting bigger”. 
But also agreements needed to be made about which tasks and workers, from each individual 
alliance partner, would go to the omgevingsdienst NZKG. This amount of tasks and workers was 
also related to the size of the share and influence the alliance partner would get in the 
omgevingsdienst NZKG. But as one of the directors said:“The more precise you try to make every 
agreement, the more you highlight the differences of all the contributing parties”. All parties  
wanted clarity about costs and tasks. However, it is impossible to know, because there are always 
hidden costs along the process. So as one of the directors says: “You always ask questions in the 
beginning that you only can answer much later in the process”. Or as another participant puts it: “it 
is difficult to know exactly the value of everything, especially of immaterial things like safety. This is 
a political choice and therefore financial agreements are also a political choice.” But to come to 
financial agreements it is according to all participants important to have trust in the quality,  
ambition and goals of the new organization. Every alliance partner contributes money and people to 
the new organization, because they believe that there is a fair exchange of value. Director X said:  
“It was important for municipality X that the customer service would become better, the safety of  
the environment higher and all this without spending more money, for me this is how concrete the 
fair exchange principle work”. 
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4.1.1 The network orchestrator/quartermaster 
On the 4th of November 2012 agreements on the political board level were made about which tasks 
the new organization would perform. On 15th of November the political board decided to appoint a 
quartermaster/network orchestrator to build the new organization. This was a crucial moment 
because from that moment on alliance partners were not talking to each other anymore but with the 
omgevingsdienst NZKG (read; quartermaster). As one of the directors said: “The quartermaster 
was the fifth power in the game”. The quartermaster/network orchestrator determined the agenda of 
the meetings, told what the strategy was and organized a new team of directors around him. 
According to one of the directors; “this top-down approach creates among some of the contributing 
parties a feeling of powerlessness, which in turn is not healthy for social commitment. It also 
creates the need to find ways to create influence and power ourselves. But in this way the whole 
process becomes a power play, which is fueled with distrust and in the end, creates qualitative less 
good decisions”. On the other hand one director said: “due to the time pressure, it is also 
understandable that the quartermaster played the power game, surpassing administrative officials, 
and dealt directly with the political board level”. 
 
 
The network orchestrator/quartermaster needed to create a company- and organization plan. The 
focus of the network orchestrator was to create the legal, material and financial agreements as a 
framework for the new organization. So the emphasis in this phase lied on the financial- and 
organizational climate. The legal and financial components were in this phase more important than 
creating social commitment. As one of the directors said: “First the organization should exist as a 
legal entity, a physical building and people working in that building. Later on we should take the 
time to get to know each other and create a culture with each other”. In the case of the 
omgevingsdienst NZKG the network orchestrator also takes the role of the quartermaster. Or to 
orchestrate a network was one of the jobs of the quartermaster. But there is a difference between a 
network orchestrator and a quartermaster. The network orchestrator needs to create social 
commitment in the alliance and among alliance partners by the means of careful process 
management. Whereas the quartermaster needs to build a new organization and create a quality 
standard for the new work. So in the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG this was a combined role, 
which created contradicting expectations among the different parties. Trust of the partners in the 
process was related to the different expectations they had from the role of the quartermaster. Some 
partners expected a negotiation role in which the orchestrator would take all needs into 
consideration and create in this way a democratic and transparent process. Other partners felt 
comfortable with the role of quartermaster. This means creating political support for decisions, and 
thereby surpassing the administrative board level, just to speed up the decision making process. The 
reasons why the expectations among partners were different can be summarized in a couple of 
variables. First, the experience a partner already had in complicated change processes. The more 
experience - the more trust there was in how processes can and would go, the more a quartermaster 
role was welcome. Second, the trust a partner had in the goals of the new organization. Third, the 
level of influence a partner had in setting the new goals of the organization. Fourth, the  
transparency in the decision making process itself. These different reasons are discussed in more 
detail further. 
 
 
The difficult part of a multi partner alliance, like the omgevingsdienst NZKG, is that each party has 
different interests. As one director said; “when different interests get into the process, the process 
itself will become more irrational”. Another director said: “directors could perceive the 
interventions of the quartermaster/network orchestrator as somebody who took their people away, 
so the need to take care of their own shop was getting more important”. Therefore, as a network 
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orchestrator/quartermaster the reasons to act with power and speed is to create a common 
understanding and willingness on a political board level. Because this was the only means to 
achieve efficient and fast decision making, the time was short and the task was complex. Then the 
political board would give the administrative officials tasks. In that way it is possible to speed up 
the process by surpassing the administrative officials. As one director explained: “it is very difficult 
to achieve common decision making with all the parties on all levels when there are a lot of 
differences”. But two other directors said it is wise and wishful to aim for a wide support from all 
parties on a board and administrative level. This creates trust and social commitment on a wider 
scale rather than only the board level. This is achievable by implementing good process 
management in which all parties are represented in an early stage. Though director X argued; 
“reality is that the quartermaster needs to fight for high quality standards of the new organization, 
and because of different interests wide support isn't always achievable”. Or as a political leader 
argues; “the role of the quartermaster isn't to create support within all parties of the alliance, but to 
build a new organization according to the given assignment”. 
 
 
In December 2012 the collective arrangement, which states which tasks the new organization is 
responsible for, was approved in the city councils of all participating municipalities. The deadline, 
for being operative, at the 1st of January 2013 put pressure on all processes. This is the main reason 
for the network orchestrator to focus on the financial climate and to make agreements about these 
financial and organizational issues on the political board level. 
 
 
In the next paragraphs some issues are discussed in more detail outside the chronological account. 
 
 
4.2 Differences between partners and financial risks 
This chapter describes participants opinions and perceptions on financial risks and the financial 
differences between alliance partners. This chapter is also an elaboration of paragraph 2 in chapter 
4.1, where the results about the differences between alliance partners were briefly discussed. 
 
 
“The smaller the financial risks for an organization, the less critical an alliance partner can be in 
the decision making processes” Quote on of the directors. 
 
 
In case of the omgevingsdienst the contributing parties were not contributing equally. The 
municipality of Amsterdam was contributing 250 FTE, and for example the municipality of 
Zaanstad included less than 10 FTE. The need for more or less formal control depends on the levels 
of the financial risks, except if some other important criteria are playing a role. These criteria may 
be; a rich experience with these kind of specific change processes, and a strong believe in the 
mission of the new organization. So if one believes in the goal and have the trust that these kind of 
alliances can work, then one can also solve other (financial) puzzles. According to one of the 
directors: “The alliance members that are financially larger can have the habit to take the lead and 
tell the other parties how everything needs to be done. This is not enhancing social commitment of 
the smaller alliance members”. Another interesting fact is that on the political board level, the 
(financial) size of the organization did not matter, or did not matter according to the fair exchange 
principal. Distribution of seats is a political game. But on the administrative level it does matter. 
Director X argues; “municipality X was one of the smallest parties, so we had the smallest financial 
risks, therefore we did not want to put too much time in all kinds of meetings (fair exchange). The 
bigger the alliance member was the more need to be in control, because their financial risk was 
bigger”. Or as another participant argues; “alliance members that are financially bigger can have 
the habit to take the lead and tell the other parties how things should work. For a smaller 
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participant like municipality X you need to determine your own position in relation to the bigger 
parties”. Director X has an anecdote to acknowledge the story about searching positions; 
 
 
“Municipality X was the smallest alliance member, but had some critical remarks about the budget 
of the new organization. The faces of the other directors in that meeting were telling everything. I 
apparently overplayed my cards”. 
 
 
4.3 Clear decision making processes, transparency and trust 
“If there is a sentiment of mistrust between people, transparency will help, but would not make a 
big difference” Quote of one of the directors. 
 
 
Clear decision making is very important in these kind of start-up processes. Director X said; “it is 
very important to report very precisely about what is going good and what is not. You want to avoid 
that the political board feels that they are tricked or mislead”. Also it is important to your own 
employees that all the decision papers are transmitted to all people. Director X says: “make sure to 
avoid that your employees or other parties think that decisions are made behind doors, mistrust is 
hard to repair”. Furthermore, it is also difficult to be clear, because as one of the directors says; “In 
reality you can think you made a clear decision and later on you notice that other parties interpret  
it differently. Checks and balances are necessary to make sure everybody is on the same page. If 
checks and balances are good, it will enhance trust within the alliance”. In this case checks and 
balances refer to the quality of the communication between alliance partners. There need to be clear 
reports from every meeting, with clear agreements. Also partners and the network orchestrator 
should check with each other the interpretation of the agreements. So openness in communication is 
very important. 
 
 
The quartermaster had chosen for a strategy which created support on the political board level. 
Some administrative officials perceived the process sometimes as unclear and this created a feeling 
of mistrust. As one of the directors said: “because of the short time period, some levels of the 
organization had to be passed by. Because if the political board would agree, the organization 
needed to follow. Thereby taking the risk into account that sometimes the administrative officials 
could slow down the process by advising the board differently”. He further states: “the new 
organization had to become more professional in comparison with the individual organizations and 
their performance in the past. Therefore, all the individual organizations needed to be audited and 
this made points of improvement clear. If you deconstruct existing practices, there will always be 
pain and mistrust” 
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5. Discussion 
In chapter two a theoretical model was developed based on the existing literature. This model 
provides a theoretical framework in which the main research question, about how the interaction 
between social and formal governance evolves during the pre-formation phase, can be understood. 
During the empirical research, the model was explored in depth and certain relations and aspects 
were supported, others had to be adjusted and some other criteria were discovered that make the 
model more specific. In this chapter the results from the research of the omgevingsdienst NZKG are 
discussed. 
 
 
5.1 Interaction between the financial climate and the relational climate 
Model 1 states that formal governance is constructed by the financial, management and 
organizational climate and social governance is constructed by the relational climate. In this 
paragraph the interaction between the financial and relational climate, in the case of the 
omgevingsdienst NZKG, is discussed. 
 
 
If we look at the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG, the financial climate was influencing the 
relational climate. Specifically, financial agreements influenced the feeling of trust within the 
alliance and trust, in turn, influenced the ability to make financial agreements. When financial 
agreements were made and every partner had insights in investments and performance expectations, 
the chance of free riding decreased. As a result the overall trust in the alliance did grow. Trust also 
influenced the process of making financial agreements. This is because some alliance partners knew 
each other from previous collaborations, and therefore trust existed in each other’s capabilities. This 
made it easier to come to financial agreements. The difficulty is that in a multi partner alliance there 
are more than two partners. Some partners know each other, others do not. Bigger alliance partners, 
the ones that invest the most money and people, have the tendency to stress in the eyes of other 
alliance partners, the topic of financial agreements. In the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG this 
meant, for example, that every number had to be calculated twice and accountancy firms gave 
second opinions. This gave the signal to other partners that there was a lack of trust in them. So an 
over emphasis of the financial figures is influencing the relational climate in a negative way. But if 
there is too little emphasis for making financial agreements free riding can occur (Das et al., 2003), 
which also undermines trust in the alliance. As one director said: ‘without clear financial 
agreements, the alliance lacks a backbone’. Acceptable financial risks influenced the social 
commitment of the alliance partners. In this case the more money and people an alliance partner 
needed to invest, the higher the social commitment of the partner was. The big losses that can come 
with big investments give reason to continue good relationships with other alliance partners. Also 
the need for control was higher, when risks are higher. Alliance partners that had higher risks and 
therefore more to lose also used social governance instruments like trust and social commitment as 
an instrument for control. But at the same time, opportunistic use of social governance instruments 
can give the signal to other alliance partners that it is used only as means to achieve own goals. And 
therefore decreases the social commitment that the smaller alliance partners have in the bigger 
alliance partners. 
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5.2 New criteria that influence the financial and relational climate 
The financial and relational climate influenced each other in different ways. Their interaction 
depended on how financial agreements were made, how high the financial risks were and if partners 
had trust in each other and were committed to each other, sometimes based on previous encounters. 
This all fluctuated in time. Because if a bigger alliance partner emphasizes the financial climate,  
this had a negative influence on the relational climate, i.e. social commitment of other partners. 
Because the perception of ‘bigger alliance parties try to control the direction of the alliance’ was 
reinforced among smaller alliance partners Which in effect, influenced the financial climate in a 
negative way. This process becomes a self-reinforcing spiral of behavior. 
 
 
Now if we take a look at model 2, there are new criteria, which in the case of the omgevingsdienst 
NZKG, influenced the financial climate, i.e. acceptable financial risks and financial agreements. 
The first criteria is that if an alliance partner had good experiences with prior complicated change 
processes, the negative sides of financial risks were more neutralized. This is because the alliance 
partners knew and believe that this kind of change processes lead to better outcomes. But if an 
alliance partner had bad experiences with alliance processes, every financial aspect needed to be 
investigated twice. In the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG the municipality of Amsterdam had 
good experiences with creating multi partner alliances. These good experiences resulted in the fact 
that the director had trust in these kind of operations, and relied less on formal governance 
instruments. So if a partner had good experiences with alliances, it was easier to make financial 
agreements, and financial agreements created trust. Good experiences of a partner with alliances 
also created more trust in alliances itself and therefore these partners needed less formal control 
mechanisms. 
 
 
Another component is that the financial and organizational size of the alliance partners is of 
influence in establishing financial agreements. The more money and people an alliance partner 
invested in the new organization, the more influence the partner wanted in, for example, strategy 
creation. The need for more influence comes with bigger financial investments and risks. In the case 
of the omgevingsdienst NZKG the smaller financial alliance partners did not feel the need of having 
many meetings and figuring out in detail what had to be paid and who is in charge. This is directly 
related to the fact that the smaller partners had smaller financial investments and risks. Smaller 
financial alliance partners can afford to be less socially committed to the alliance because the 
financial risks are smaller for them. So financial risks can influence social commitment of the 
partners. In the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG this also had to do with the fair exchange 
principle, which is related to the financial climate. Alliance partners needed to have the idea that 
there is a fair value distribution according to the effort and money they put in the new alliance. If 
there is no fair exchange of value or between input and output, in the eyes of alliance partners,  
social commitment can be damaged severely and might end up with partners leaving the alliance.  
So in this way the fair exchange principle, as part of the financial climate, is interacting with the 
relational climate. 
 
 
Another important factor, in the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG, that enabled making financial 
agreements is the aspect of shared strategy creation. If there is time (context variable) to create a 
strategy with all alliance partners, trust of the partners in the alliance will enhance. This in result, as 
seen in model 2, will make it easier to find support for making certain financial agreements. So as 
one director said: “If all parties understand and acknowledge the strategy and reasons behind the 
strategy for the new alliance, financial agreements are made easier”. 
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The last, but new, component that influences the financial climate - i.e. the making of financial 
agreements - are the different levels in an organization (political/administrative & strategic/ 
operational). Whereas the administrative level is more occupied with financial and managerial  
issues (formal governance), the board level is more concerned about the political side of 
management control (how is a decision or action perceived by the other alliance partners, media or 
city council). This can lead to different agendas in common meetings. For example, the fair 
exchange principle, which is about the fair exchange between input and output for an alliance 
partner, does not seem to be completely of interest on the political board level. On the  
administrative level the fair exchange principle plays an important role. He or she makes a balance 
about what is the input and the output and if it is balanced. A politician is not calculating from his or 
her own perspective but also from the perspective of the council and the public opinion of the 
people. For example, the Amsterdam alderman did not want to be the chairman of the political 
board, because this would strengthen the perception of other alliance partners that Amsterdam as the 
biggest alliance partner controls every action. This can be used against the alderman by the labor 
union for example. 
 
5.3 The interaction between the management and organizational climate and the relational 
climate 
In this paragraph the interaction between the management and organizational climate and the 
relational climate will be discussed, as encountered in the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG. The 
management and organizational climate is constructed by the following components: ‘the network 
orchestrator’ and ‘clear decision making process’. 
 
 
The network orchestrator played an important role in the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG. The 
network orchestrator had a big influence on many processes3. Theoretically, as model 1 shows, the 
network orchestrator directly influenced the elements of clear decision making process and joint 
problem solving. The job of the network orchestrator is to manage the alliance, by creating clear 
processes and to involve the alliance partners in these processes. In the case of the omgevingsdienst 
NZKG, the function of the network orchestrator was much more complicated mainly because the 
network orchestrator influences indirectly every element in model 2. The network orchestrator 
needs to create clear decision making processes, which interact with the relational climate, i.e. 
social commitment of partners. If alliance partners, in the case of the omgevingsdienst NZKG, 
perceived the decision making process as something that is done behind closed doors, the feeling of 
trust and social commitment were influenced in a negative way. 
 
 
Another aspect is that some alliance partners expected a network orchestrator to create a democratic 
decision making process (social governance), taking into account different partners and their needs 
and discuss differences to try to achieve a compromise, while other alliance partners were satisfied 
with the quartermaster role (formal governance). This means, as can be seen in model 2, that the 
network orchestrator and his personal management style is decisive in choosing the strategy for 
creating a clear and shared decision making process. A network orchestrator’s choice for a wide 
democratic bottom-up process (a more social and relational approach of the decision making 
process) or a faster top-down political board process (a more formal and financial approach of the 
decision making process), depends on various elements. One of the elements is time. How much 
time does a network orchestrator have to build a new alliance? As in the case of the 
omgevingsdienst NZKG, the less time there is, the bigger the need for a fast top-down strategy. 
 
 
3 Model 2 would become too complicated if every interaction line would be placed. 
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Another element is the personal management style of the network orchestrator. Some managers 
preferred a fast top-down process and did not have affection and the set of skills to facilitate a broad 
bottom-up process. The style and strategy that was chosen by the network orchestrator influenced 
the trustworthiness of the alliance partners in the new alliance. In the case of the omgevingsdienst 
NZKG the fast top-down strategy undermined trust of some directors on the administrative level. 
The wider support strategy can create more social commitment on both the board and higher 
administrative level. To choose for a top down support strategy is effective but did not create the 
social commitment and trust on every level of the alliance member organizations. Another aspect to 
take into consideration is that alliance members on higher and more strategic levels, which own 
interests were not aligned with the goals of the new alliance, tended to see the network orchestrator 
more as a ‘new power’ than as somebody who orchestrates the network. Which in effect had a 
negative influence on the relational climate/social commitment. 
 
 
The style and strategy of the network orchestrator and the expectations that the alliance partners had 
about this role, can be of a big influence on trust and social commitment in the alliance. In the case 
of the omgevingsdienst NZKG the strategy of the network orchestrator effectuated speed and clear 
decision making, but the top-down approach negatively interacted with the relational climate, in this 
case the social commitment of the alliance partners on an administrative level. 
 
 
5.4 Interaction between financial climate and management and organizational climate 
To come to financial agreements, the network orchestrator played a crucial role. As in the case of 
the omgevingsdienst NZKG the network orchestrator facilitated and organized all meetings about 
(financial) agreements and gave input about the content and consequences of the agreements. And 
with providing all this crucial information he created a transparent decision making process. Each 
alliance partner had the same kind of information. So by providing the same information to each 
partner and made this process very open, the network orchestrator created trust among the partners 
and trust in the process itself. So to come to financial agreements, the network orchestrator needed 
to create a clear decision making process. Because alliance members who have influence on the 
decision making process, will be more socially committed to the alliance. But to take all partners 
and their interests in consideration takes time. As a result, all kinds of questions and rumors on the 
working floor can pop up and this undermines trust in the new alliance. So what can create trust in 
the higher ranks of the alliance can create mistrust in the lower parts of the alliance. 
 
 
The duration of the decision making process also depends on whether the alliance partners had a 
steady belief in the mission of the new alliance and if they had good experiences with previous 
alliances. Moreover, what is important to take into account, is that the whole process of the start-up 
of an alliance is not purely a rational one. When different interests are at work, the whole process 
can look irrational, though from a local perspective the seeming irrationality can be understood. For 
example, the mission or strategy of the new alliance is not always leading the choices people make. 
All the research participants on board or higher administrative level agreed that if everybody is 
focused on the end goal, processes can become smoother. 
 
 
Model two is a complex model, but it reflects the complexity of these kinds of processes. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this research about the omgevingsdienst NZKG the following research question was investigated: 
“How does the interaction between formal governance, constituted by the financial climate, 
management and organizational climate, and social governance, constituted by the relational 
climate, in the multi partner alliance omgevingsdienst in the pre-formation phase evolve?” 
 
 
In this thesis I used a climate approach, which Rochemont (2010) is using to operationalize the two 
forms of governance, meaning formal and social governance. The climate approach is an interesting 
approach because it approaches complex interactional patterns, like formal and social governance, 
not isolated, but integrated. The climates and their components were used to create model 1. In this 
model the relations and interactions were described from a theoretical perspective. The model also 
introduced some important research topics, derived from the climates. These topics were used as a 
structure in the interviews which determined my case study about the omgevingsdienst NZKG. 
 
 
I did my best to map the full complexity of interaction patterns but all climates and their variables 
play very important roles simultaneously and on different organizational levels. This made it more 
difficult to comprehend and map the full complexity and to oversee the whole playing field of 
stakeholders, needs, thoughts and emotions. 
 
 
Triangle interaction 
There are some important conclusions to make. The financial climate, the management and 
organizational climate and the relational climate interact with each other in multiple directions. 
Though this triangle interaction is not discussed in the specific literature about climates in relation 
to alliances. For example; financial agreements interact with trustworthiness but, without a clear 
decision making process, trust decreases and so also the chance of making financial agreements. 
Trust is related to financial risks and shared strategy creation, but the network orchestrator has a big 
role in facilitating the process of shared strategy creation, which influences trust and financial risks. 
These examples make clear that the story behind the model is more complex and nuanced than it 
may look. 
 
 
Supported interactions and new criteria 
If we look at specific interaction patterns between the financial climate and the relational climate, 
some conclusions can be made. Financial agreements and trustworthiness interact with each other. 
Financial risks interact with social commitment and vice versa. The research also shows that a clear 
decision making process creates social commitment among partners. Partners are more willing to 
sustain relationships when they understand and know who decides what and when. This part of 
model 1 is supported. 
 
 
There are some new criteria that also influence the financial- and relational climate. Previous 
experiences that partners have with alliances influence the height of the financial risks that they 
accept. Previous experiences also influence the trust in the alliance and the belief that an effective 
alliance exist. Another new criteria that affects both the financial and the relational climate is shared 
strategy creation. If the strategy is created in a joint process with all partners, the making of 
financial agreements can be less complicated. This has to do, and here it influences the relational 
climate, with the fact that in a joint strategy process partners trust in the alliance enhances. Then the 
fact that a political organization has different levels (political/administrative/strategic/operational) 
influences the financial climate. This is sinceSome levels, like the administrative one, can stress the 
financial figures, where other levels can give these figures less importance. Because different levels 
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create more complexity the need for a shared strategy enhances. This is since a shared strategy 
functions as structure in chaos. 
 
 
Network orchestrator 
Some conclusions can also be made about the interaction between the management and 
organizational climate and the relational climate. The network orchestrator needs to create a clear 
decision making process, but at the same time needs to influence a lot of different processes, 
sometimes directly sometimes indirectly. The network orchestrator needs to create trust in the new 
alliance, by creating a clear and joint decision making process, but he also needs to arrange 
financial agreements between all partners. A new criterion that influences the relational climate is 
the personal style of the network orchestrator. If a network orchestrator’s style is characterized by 
fast, clear and top-down decision making, trust can be influenced negatively. If the personal style is 
more characterized by a broad, democratic, bottom-up approach, trust in the alliance enhances. Of 
course to facilitate and organize a bottom-up democratic process there must be enough time, 
because if the alliance needs to be operational in a short time an extensive bottom-up process is not 
possible. 
 
 
6.1 Limitations 
It is important to point out some limitations with respect to the methodology and research purpose. 
Sandberg (1995) says: “Given truth as intentional fulfillment, criteria of reliability, such as 
replicability and interjudge reliability of results relating to objective reality, fall outside the domain 
of interest in achieving reliability within interpretive approaches. Instead, the proposed truth 
constellation implies first and foremost that researchers must demonstrate how they have dealt with 
their intentional relation to the lived experience studied. That is, researchers must demonstrate how 
they have controlled and checked their interpretations throughout the research process: from 
formulating the research question, selecting individuals to be studied, obtaining data from those 
individuals, analyzing the data obtained, and reporting the results”. 
 
From this perspective Sandberg (2005) identifies three criteria for determining the trustworthiness  
of knowledge in interpretive research. The first is communicative validity and means achieving truth 
according to the notion of perceived fulfillment. One of the limitations when it comes to 
communicative validity of this research is that the participant,s because of a busy agenda, could  
only be interviewed once. If more interviews could be conducted the range of misinterpretation 
should have decreased. 
 
When it comes to pragmatic validity a limitation is that the case itself was a political sensitive one. 
Because of the politically sensitive nature of this case, it was more difficult to achieve this 
pragmatic validity. Politicians cannot admit their inconsistency when confronted with the 
discrepancies between saying and doing. The democratic system itself makes it impossible to make 
and therefore keep promises because coalitions change and so the political priorities also. Another 
limitation of this research in relation to pragmatic validity is that I did not misinterpret deliberately 
the participants answer to see how they react to my misinterpretation. Another limitation is that I 
did not apply the participant observation method so I could observe possible discrepancies between 
‘saying’ and ‘doing’. 
 
The third criteria is transgressive validity. A complication in qualitative research, in this case 
interviews, when it comes to validity is that it is always difficult to know if the interviewee is telling 
the truth or the interviewee and the researcher have an shared understanding about the interview 
topic. This also has impact on the reliability of the research. A different researcher could obtain 
26  
different answers and the fact that I was a member of one of the participating alliance municipalities 
could affected the answers of the interviewees. One way that can form a limitation to this kind of 
validity was the fact that I was professionally involved within this alliance and therefore could be 
biased. But I was aware of my own subjectivity during the research and therefore sometimes i also 
tested my own assumptions about the startup process of the omgevingsdienst NZKG with other 
participants. A limitation of this research in relation to transgressive validity is that I did not cross 
member check the reports. This was not possible to do because of the political sensitivity of the 
subject. Because transgressive validity can effect pragmatic and communicative validity, the last 
ones are focussing on establishing coherent interpretations and the first one is keen on 
inconsistencies, this research scores higher on transgressive validity then on communicative and 
pragmatic validity. This is an explanation for the complexity of the results. Also the complexity of 
the results is related to this specific case and space/time continuum. Results cannot be projected on 
other public alliances. 
 
6.2 Practical implications 
This research has several practical implications. First of all, the network orchestrator has an 
important role in building the new organization and creating trust and social commitment within the 
alliance. Therefore it is beneficial to oversee the players, their differences (culturally, financially) 
and their history and experience with these kind of projects. The startup process forms a good 
opportunity to talk about these topics (differences between partners, previous experience with 
complicated change processes) with the alliance members, thereby creating a common frame of 
reference, which sets the path to creating a common strategy. Both financial and relational 
interventions should be balanced in the pre-formation phase. It is also important to understand the 
relations between the different partners and how they see each other, this can give insights in how 
and why they can act seemingly irrationally. Second, it is very important to create time and space  
for a mixed top-down/bottom-up approach. Shared strategy creation is crucial for long term social 
commitment. A network orchestrator needs to be appointed to maintain good relations with and 
between partners, also facilitating a transparent and clear decision making process. This will 
improve trust and social commitment. Thereby it is also important to understand the different needs 
on a political and administrative level, the fair exchange principle and financial agreements (what 
do we put in and get in return) works differently on these levels. The sensitivity for seeing and 
acknowledging this can create trust and social commitment, especially on the administrative level. 
Trust is a crucial factor in all processes, and relates to all variables. However trust is a perceived 
phenomenon and not an objective one. This may explain why some partners had trust and others did 
not and why some interventions enhanced trust and social commitment with one alliance member 
and damaged it with another alliance member. To build trust is a delicate process. Trust is  
something one earns by deeds not words. If alliance members show congruent behavior, they do 
what they say and vice versa, it will enhance trust. There are some cliché truths that are also 
applicable to this case, such as: “Trust takes years to build and seconds to destroy” and “Action 
speaks louder than words”. 
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6.3 Future research 
In contrast with expectations, theoretical and empirical research on multi partner alliance 
management remains limited. Most scholars have approached the antecedents of multi partner 
alliance management control from isolated mono-theoretical perspectives (Rochemont, 2010). This 
is an important shortcoming, because understanding management control of multi partner 
cooperation demands a multidisciplinary approach (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2006). Some scholars  
adopt a social governance view, such as Das et al., (2002). Other scholars have only looked from a 
formal governance perspective (Garcia-Canal et al., 2003) or game theory (Hwang et al., 1997). The 
climate approach is a useful approach to get better and broader insights on the dynamics of 
management control. But the climate approach does not take into account different context  
variables. Therefore results can be misinterpreted. This research shows some variables, from a 
process view, that enrich the climate approach. By conducting this research through the method of 
open interviews more variables were identified which interact in subtle ways with trust and social 
commitment. These variables are for example; previous experience with complex change processes, 
a political perspective on management control, irrational decision making and how the financial size 
of a partner interacts with formal control mechanisms. Future research should take these new 
findings into consideration. 
 
 
From a process view more research needs to be done to understand how different alliance partner 
interests interact with the role of the network orchestrator. Further research should focus on whether 
the results from this research can be falsified in other public alliance case studies. 
 
 
Also more research needs to be done into how and when above context variables interact with 
formal and social governance mechanisms. Another interesting research may look into the way in 
which people in political functions perceive management control in public alliances, because in this 
case study the perception of management and politics on management control was different. 
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Appendix 1: Topic list 
 
 
Alliance Phase Concept Item Source 
Pre-formation 
phase 
Financial climate Financial 
agreements 
 
 
Acceptable 
financial risks 
Williamson, 1985 
 
 
Mothe et al., 2000 
 Management and 
organizational 
climate 
Network 
orchestrator 
 
 
Clear - decision - 
making process 
Doz et., 1998 
 
 
 
Bamford et al., 2003 
 Relational 
climate 
Social 
commitment 
 
 
Joint problem 
solving 
 
 
Trustworthiness 
Cullen et al., 2000 
 
 
Claro et al., 2003 
Barney et al., 1994 
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Appendix 2: Protocol guide 
 
 
Introductory protocol 
To facilitate my note-taking, I would like to tape our conversations today. For your information, 
only my teachers on this research project will have access to the audio files which will be destroyed 
after they are transcribed. Also the report I make about our conversation will be member checked, 
this means I will ask you to give your feedback about the report. We have planned this interview to 
last no longer than an hour. During this time, we have several questions that I would like to cover. If 
time begins to run short, it may be necessary to interrupt you in order to push ahead and complete 
this line of questioning. 
 
 
Introduction 
You have been selected to participate in the research because you have been identified as someone 
who has a great deal to share about the start-up process of the omgevingsdienst Noordzeekanaal 
gebied. This research project as a whole focuses on the improvement of management control in 
multi partner alliances in a political setting, with particular interest in the interaction between the 
formal aspects of governance (i.e. financial agreements, acceptable financial risks, clear decision 
making process and the network orchestrator) and the social aspects of governance (trustworthiness, 
competence-based trust, social commitment, joint problem solving). The interview will start with a 
“grand tour” question on how you as a participant describe and looks back at the start-up process 
(pre-formation phase) of the omgevingsdienst. My study does not aim to evaluate your techniques  
or experiences. Rather, i'm trying to learn more about the pre-formation phase around multi partner 
alliances, and hopefully learn about management control practices that help improve the start-up of 
such organizations. 
 
 
A. Interviewee background 
1. Briefly describe your role as it relates to the omgevingsdienst NZKG, especially in the pre- 
formation phase. 
 
 
2. Do you already have experience with or in multi partner alliances? 
 
 
B. Research topics and questions 
1. How do you perceive the whole pre-formation phase of the omgevingsdienst NZKG, in relation 
to management control? 
 
 
Topics 
1. Financial agreements about value appropriation 
2. Acceptable financial risks 
3. Network orchestrator 
4. Clear- decision making process 
5. Social commitment 
6. Joint problem solving 
